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Testing a point (sharp) null hypothesis is arguably the most widely used statistical
inferential procedure in many fields of scientific research, nevertheless, the most
controversial, and misapprehended. Since 1935 when Buchanan-Wollaston raised the
first criticism against hypothesis testing, this foundational field of statistics has drawn
increasingly active and stronger opposition, including draconian suggestions that
statistical significance testing should be abandoned or even banned. Statisticians should
stop ignoring these accumulated and significant anomalies within the current point-null
hypotheses paradigm and rebuild healthy foundations of statistical science. The
foundation for a paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses is suggested, which is
testing interval null hypotheses based on implications of the Zero probability paradox. It
states that in a real-world research point-null hypothesis of a normal mean has zero
probability. This implies that formulated point-null hypothesis of a mean in the context of
the simple normal model is almost surely false. Thus, Zero probability paradox points to
the root cause of so-called large n problem in significance testing. It discloses that there is
no point in searching for a cure under the current point-null paradigm.
Keywords:
zero-probability paradox, point null hypothesis, Lebesgue measure,
rational numbers, algebraic numbers, almost sure false null hypothesis, inexactification,
paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses.

“It cannot be denied that, during the recent rapid development
of practical methods, fundamental problems have been ignored
and fundamental paradoxes left unresolved”
Fisher (1922)
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Introduction
Following Fisher’s foundational contribution to significance tests, and Neyman
and Pearson to hypothesis tests, statistical testing has become widely adopted by
researchers as the most common statistical inferential approach in almost all
different branches of science. However, there has been a steadily growing
dissatisfaction in the scientific community with traditional tests of the point (sharp,
precise) null hypothesis. Since Buchanan-Wollaston (1935) raised the first
criticism against significance testing, their application has been debated
extensively, and numerous objections and severe complaints have been leveled
against their utility. Critics also accentuated statistical tests are not only overused,
but are often misunderstood and misused. Nickerson (2000) provided a summary
of common misconceptions, and criticisms as well as arguments in support of null
hypothesis testing, from a non-statistician viewpoint.
The most trenchant critics requested significance tests should be abandoned,
banned or deinstitutionalized (e.g., Lindley, 1975; Hunter, 1997; Armstrong,
2007; Orlitzky, 2012). The editors of the American Journal of Public Health
imposed a ban, although it only lasted two years. Similarly, in 1997 the officers of
the American Psychological Association (APA) created a task force to make
recommendations about appropriate statistical practice and to consider banning
significance testing. The proposal was regarded as too extreme and was rejected
(Wilkinson, 1999). More recently, in 2015, the editors of Basic and Applied
Social Psychology journal enforced a ban on significance testing (as well as
confidence intervals). On behalf of the ASA Board of Directors, Wasserstein &
Lazar (2016) formulated six principles regarding the usage of p-values, hoping
that the ASA statement would open a fresh discussion with regards to the use of
statistical inference.
The ASA’s statement should be praised as the first organized reply from
statistics community to the abovementioned issues. However, it did not address
the fundamental problems and did not provide a new perspective on statistical
testing.
Critics advocated reform of statistical inference and statistics education.
They recommended less emphasis should be placed on reporting of p values,
cynically termed “harvest of asterisks” (Cohen, 1990). The reformers, mainly
non-statisticians, argued attention should be shifted to effect size, point estimation,
confidence interval, information theoretic approaches (e.g., Akaike Information
Criterion), graphical methods, and progressively more on the communication of
results using Bayesian inference.
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Consider two of the most important criticisms of significance testing: (1)
point null hypotheses are unlikely to be true, and (2) a statistical significant result
is always obtainable with a sufficiently large sample. The scope of this paper is
limited to the problem of testing the mean of a normal distribution, although this
problem is of substantial importance because of its widespread application in
statistical theory and practice. The primary objective is to prove that in the realworld research when testing the mean of a normal distribution using a point-null
hypothesis, the probability of that hypothesis is zero. We call this result the Zero
probability paradox. This paradox undoubtedly reveals logical deficiency of a
point-null hypothesis of a normal mean: in reality, its testing is actually a
procedure that unequivocally will lead (with sufficiently large sample) to a
foregone conclusion that formulated null hypothesis is almost surely false. The
logical name for this procedure in which a sharp null hypothesis is ultimately
being rejected should be “inexactification,” rather than testing (Good, 1994, p.
241).

The Existence of Point Null Hypothesis: History and
Overview
Testing a point null hypothesis is arguably the most widely used and at the same
time the most controversial, misapprehended and severely criticized statistical
procedure in many fields of scientific research. Focus on one of the most common
criticisms, that point null hypotheses are not realistic. The Zero probability
paradox, presented here, evolved as a result of persuasive and accumulated ideas
of statisticians, and non-statisticians referred to in this section.
There is a vast amount of references in statistics and non-statistics literature
with the claim that, in reality, point null hypotheses are almost always false.
Critics, however, supported this statement only by intuitive arguments, empirical
evidence, and common sense. One of the early critics, L. J. Savage (1954, p. 254),
disproved the validity of tests “in which the null hypothesis is such that it would
not really be accepted by anyone.” I. R. Savage, (1957, p. 332-333) asserted the
“null hypotheses of no difference are usually known to be false before the data are
collected…when they are, their rejection or acceptance simply reflects the size of
the sample and the power of the test, and is not a contribution to science.”
Nunnally (1960, p. 642) expressed a similar assertion, but admitted he agreed
although he cannot prove it directly. However, he argued it is supported both by
common sense and by practical experience. Likewise, Meehl, (1967, p. 108)
pointed out there is “universal agreement that the old point-null hypothesis…is
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[quasi-] always false in biological and social science.” His opinion was based on
the result that in “psychological and sociological investigations involving very
large numbers of subjects, it is regularly found that almost all correlations or
differences between means are statistically significant” (p. 109). Meehl illustrated
this by providing an example of a large sample of over 55,000 Minnesota high
school seniors that revealed 91% significant associations among a collection of 45
variables.
In the same way, Cohen (1990, p. 1308) stated the null hypothesis “taken
literally (and that's the only way you can take it in formal hypothesis testing), is
always false in the real world. It can only be true in the bowels of a computer
processor running a Monte Carlo study (and even then a stray electron may make
it false). If it is false, even to a tiny degree, it must be the case that a large enough
sample will produce a significant result and lead to its rejection. So if the null is
always false, what’s the big deal about rejecting it?"
There is near consensus in the literature that exactly true point null
hypotheses are extremely rare in reality. This is exemplified by the following by
Kadane (1987, p. 347): “For the last 15 or so years I have been looking for
applied cases in which I might have some serious belief in a null hypothesis. In
that time I found only one [testing an astrologer claim that on the bases of peoples
birthdays it is possible to predict who is likely to have a drug problem]... I do not
expect to test a precise hypothesis as a serious statistical calculation.”
In a similar manner, there was a quest for an existence of a realistic case for
which a null hypothesis cannot be regarded beforehand as false. As a result of
this pursuit, a commonly given example is found, that there is no extrasensory
effect in a parapsychological experiment. Good (1994, p. 241) argued there is at
least one example of a precisely sharp null hypothesis: precognition is impossible.
Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2006, p. 45) suggested astrology cannot predict the future.
Berger and Delampady (1987, p. 320), although admitting that it is perhaps
impossible to have a null hypothesis that can be exactly modeled as θ = θ0, noted
talking to plants has no effect on their growth. Nevertheless, they admitted minor
biases in the design of the experiments may produce statistical significance. They
also argued that point null hypotheses are reasonable approximations to fuzzy
precise (small interval) nulls. However, as pointed out by Bernardo (1999, p. 102)
“this approximation always breaks down for sufficiently large samples.” Likewise,
Rousseau (2007) showed for large samples the Bayes factor associated with point
null hypotheses is a poor approximation of Bayes factors of interval null
hypotheses unless the intervals are extremely small.
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In contrast, Zellner (1987, p. 339) emphasized many realistic examples of
point null hypotheses can be given in testing well-formulated physical laws, such
as s =. 5gt2 and E = mc2. Kass and Raftery (1995, p. 788) argued although “one
rarely believes a scientific law in an absolute sense, it is a great convenience to
speak and to act as if laws are valid. When one says that a certain theory is correct,
one means that deviations from it are sufficiently minor to be irrelevant for all
practical purposes at hand.”
Based on the above arguments, a natural question arises: why are we testing
point null hypotheses at all, when it is known in advance they are almost never
exactly true in the real world? Sprenger (2013) argued these hypotheses often give
useful idealization of reality. He considered this originated in the Popperian
philosophy of science: “only a highly testable or improbable theory is worth
testing and is actually (and not only potentially) satisfactory if it withstands severe
tests.” (Popper, 1963, p. 219–220)
According to Cox (2006, p. 31) null hypothesis refers to a probability model,
and this implies idealization. He argued it would be absurd to think that a
mathematical model could be an exact representation of a real system. Thus, null
hypotheses are postulated within a system that is untrue.
Good (1956, p. 254) remarked a null hypothesis is tested, although it is
known in advance it cannot be exactly true, because “we wish to test whether the
hypothesis is in some sense approximately true, or whether it is rejectable on the
sort of size of sample that we intend to take.” Kruskal (1968) indicated the need is
to test whether the mean is near µ0, meaning as near as makes no substantive
difference. He stated this will be achieved as long as the sample sizes and
significance levels are reasonable and the power is at least moderately large for
alternatives interestingly different from the null hypothesis.
Edwards, et al. (1963) presented a Bayesian view on the sharp null
hypothesis problem. They acknowledged in usual applications the null hypothesis
is known to be false from the outset, because realistically the null hypothesis
cannot be infinitely sharp. From a Bayesian perspective, a sharp null hypothesis is
likely to be appropriate only when it deserves special initial credence. They also
highlighted in Bayesian analysis the null hypothesis is “a hazily defined small
region rather than a point [italicized by authors]” (p. 235).
Finally, consider Krueger’s (2001) attempt to explain why all null
hypotheses are false. He started from the premise that in statistics populations are
mathematical abstractions that contain infinite possible observations. “This
implies an infinite number of possible states of the population, and each of these
states may be a distinct hypothesis. With an infinite number of hypotheses, no
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individual hypothesis can be true with any calculable probability” (p. 17). It is,
however, clear that his arguments on the survival of the flawed significance
testing are themselves flawed. It is erroneous to claim that one-sided and interval
null hypotheses are always false.
It can be concluded existing literature does not offer proof of the
extraordinary statement that all point null hypotheses are false.

The Nature of a Point Null Hypothesis
Before exposing the Zero probability paradox, it is of fundamental importance to
clarify some misconceptions about the nature of the point null hypothesis.
Suppose that a random sample of size n, X = (X1, X2 , …, Xn), is selected
from the normal population N(θ, σ2), where θ is an unknown mean assuming
values in a parameter space Θ  1 . Suppose also that the variance, σ2 > 0 is
known. It is required to test the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 versus an unspecified
alternative hypothesis H1 : θ ≠ θ0. Regard this sharp or point null hypothesis as a
numerically exact statement, that is free of vagueness and ambiguity, namely as
an assertion that exactly specifies a single value of a parameter θ0. In other words,
it is obvious that θ0 as a crisp number, not a fuzzy number.
It is well known that to every real number there corresponds a unique point
on the number line and vice versa. Obviously, point hypothetical value θ0
corresponds to a distinctive point on the real number line, not to an interval. As
Euclid gave an intuitive definition in the first sentence from his Elements book 1,
“a point is that which has no part, or which has no magnitude.” In the
contemporary notion, this is tantamount to saying that a point is a dimensionless
entity that has only a location. It also naturally implies that “every point is
unextended” (Playfair, 1819, p. 289).
Claims that there are different kinds of sharp hypotheses, some fuzzy sharp
and some infinitely sharp, in other words, that equal sign can be perceived in
infinitely different ways, are unconvincing. If testing “hazily defined small region”
is considered a null hypothesis in a scientific, non-subjective way, then it is a sine
qua non to formulate that hypothesis accurately, for example, as H0 :|θ – θ0 | ≤ δ or
using fuzzy set theory as H 0 :   0 , where  is the unknown fuzzy parameter
and  0 a known fuzzy number. However, in the traditional point null hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0 , in practice, (since the pioneering work of Arbuthnott (1710)) θ0 has
always been formulated as a crisp rational number, never as a fuzzy number  .
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A fuzzy number,  , in contrast, is a distinctly different entity. It is defined
as a fuzzy set in
with a normal, fuzzy convex and a continuous membership
function of bounded support. Note also that, in the fuzzy set framework, the
possible values of the parameter of interest are expressed as linguistic variables,
and that the data are observations of a normal fuzzy random sample. In conclusion,
0  0 , that is, (Crisp number = Fuzzy number), is nothing else but a selfdeception.

Zero Probability Paradox
In a real-world research, the probability of an exact point-null hypothesis of the
mean of a normally distributed population is zero. Let
be the set of all rational
real numbers, that is

 m / n; m, n  , n  0 , where

stands for the set of all

integers. Suppose, as in the previous section, that a random sample of size n,
X = (X1 , X2, …, Xn), is selected from the normal population N(θ, σ2), where θ is an
unknown mean assuming values in a parameter space Θ  1 . Divide parameter
space into two disjoints sets  and  \ that are mutually exclusive
(  

\

  ) and exhaustive (     

\

). Suppose further that the set

 is equivalent to the set of all rational numbers

and that 

\

is equivalent

to the set of all irrational numbers \ .
It is desired to test the traditional null hypothesis

H 0 :   0

(1)

versus an unspecified alternative hypothesis

H1 :   0 ,
where θ0 is a rational number, i.e. 0 
.
Point-null zero probability paradox (Zero Probability paradox).
Probability of the null hypothesis (1) is equal to zero:



P H 0 |  
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This is tantamount to saying that probability of the null hypothesis

P  H 0 |   All rational numbers  0, and
P  H1 |   All irrational numbers  1.
Here, regard rationals on the number line as indicators of the means of
corresponding normal distributions that have rational numbers as their means.
Proof:
A)

B)

In scientific research and statistical practice, any point null
hypothesis of the normal population is almost always stated as a
single rational number.
As proved by Cantor in 1873, rational numbers are countable—that
is, there is in one-one correspondence between the rational numbers
and the natural numbers (see, for example, Calkin and Wilf, 2000,
for a binary tree argument). Because the rational numbers, qi, are
 i1qi  .
countable, enumerate them as a sequence {qi}, or
Hence, the set of all hypothetical null values of the point-null
hypotheses that could be expressed using rational numbers,  , is

C)

also countable. In other words, this set has a bijective
correspondence to the set of rational numbers.
The Lebesgue measure of any singleton set, {x}, is zero (where
singleton means the smallest possible nonempty set). Every
countable set has Lebesgue measure zero (see, for example, Adams
and Guillemin, 1996, p. 9). Therefore, Lebesgue measure of the set
of
all
rational
numbers
is
also
zero,
that
is



 



qi     qi   0 .


i 1

i 1

In light of this fact, Lebesgue measure of the set of all
hypothetical null values of the point-null hypotheses that could be
expressed using rational numbers ( H 0 :   ) is also zero because
this set is countable, λ(  ) = 0.
D)

Normal distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure λ. This signifies that all sets which have zero
Lebesgue measure must also have zero probability under probability
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E)

F)

measure; i.e., for all events A  R such that µ(A) = 0 → PX(A) = 0.
As Borovkov (2013, p. 39) has nicely exemplified “for an absolutely
continuous distribution, the probability of hitting a set of zero
Lebesgue measure is zero.”
Because for an absolutely continuous distribution, a countably
infinite set of all rational numbers has Lebesgue measure zero,
conclude their probability measure is also zero.
Therefore, probability measure of a set of all possible hypothetical
null rational values of the point-null hypotheses in testing a normal



mean is also zero, P H 0 |  

  0 .

This unequivocally

amounts to the deduction that any single-point null hypothesis about
the normal mean has also probability zero, that is,
P(Point-null hypothesis formulated as a rational number | Normal
distribution) = 0.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
Subsequently, the probability of point null formulated as an irrational
number is one. Figuratively speaking, rationals occupy zero length on a real line
and the set of irrationals is uncountably infinite.
The scope of the Zero probability paradox can be further extended to the
even more general set of all point null hypotheses asserted as real algebraic
numbers, that is, the roots of single variable polynomial equations whose
coefficients are all integers. This set includes rational numbers, Gaussian integers,
golden ratio, constructible numbers, some irrational numbers such as √3, etc.
Because this set is countable, as also proved by Cantor in 1874, (see, for example,
Kaplansky, 2001, Paradox 4, p. 23) it has Lebesgue measure zero and therefore
under Gaussian distribution its probability is zero. The cardinality (a measure of
the "number of elements of the set") of the algebraic numbers is א0 (aleph-naught),
the same as the natural numbers and rational numbers. However, the cardinality of
the set of transcendental numbers is the same as that of the set of real numbers
, the cardinality of the continuum. Almost all real numbers are transcendental,
but we are familiar with almost none of them (except, for example, π, e, Liouville
numbers, Champernowne constant, etc.).
It is important to emphasize that the Zero probability paradox applies both
in the case when population variance is known and unknown.
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It might be objected that a point-null hypothesis that the mean of the errors
made in astronomical observations is equal to zero is reasonable and that its
probability could be larger than zero. Karl Pearson (1935a, p. 296) replied, “I
have never found a normal curve fit anything if there are enough observations!
The astronomical data provided to prove that errors of observation follow normal
curves are pitiably scanty, and if proper tests are applied usually show that they
do not!”

Conclusion
Zero Probability and Impossibility.
Before discussing some of the implications of the Zero probability paradox, it is
of considerable interest to clarify the difference between zero probability and
impossibility. The most common and persistent misconception in the literature
about probability is the interpretation that zero probability implies that an event is
impossible. This is equally shared by many applied statistics textbooks writers
(for example, Everitt, 1999, p. 14; de Muth, 2014, p. 20; Burns & Burns, 2008, p.
164; Sharma, 2010, p. 191) and non-statisticians (for example, Poole &
Mackworth, 2010, p. 296; Finlayson & McMahon, 2004, p. 360; Yoe, 2012, p.
305; Quinn and Keough, 2002, p. 7). This does not come as a surprise since many
notable scholars held the same false impression in the past.
As reported by Finetti (2008, p. 49), Borel used to say “let us consider the
probabilities 10-3, 10-10, 10-100, 10-1000. A probability of 10 -1000 is roughly equal to
the probability of picking by chance a particular atom in the entire universe.”
Indeed, Borel (1962, p. 3), one of the founding fathers of measure theory,
proposed in a book for the non-scientists published in 1943 “the single law of
chance,” or Borel’s law. It states “Events with a sufficiently small probability
never occur; or at least, we must act, in all circumstances, as if they were
impossible.” Similar interpretations were given by many other eminent scientists
who tried to relate probabilities to the physical world. For example, Bernoulli
(1713, pp. 211-212) stated in the first chapter of Part IV of his Ars Conjectandi
that “if one thing is considered morally certain which has 999/1000 certainty,
another thing will be morally impossible, which has only 1/1000 certainty.”
Cournot (1843, p. 78) also tried to build a bridge from probability theory to the
physical world by stating that “a physically impossible event is one whose
probability is infinitely small.” Likewise, Popper (2002, p. 195) pointed out that
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“the rule that extreme improbabilities have to be neglected…agrees with the
demand for scientific objectivity.”
However, today, there is an almost general agreement among statisticians
that probability zero means “almost surely impossible” or extremely unlikely. In
other words, an event of zero probability will almost never happen but there may
be exceptions. For example, Kolmogorov (1956, p. 5) emphasized that “P(A) = 0
does not imply the impossibility of A…all we can assert is that…event A is
practically impossible.” According to Hand (2014, p. 6), “extremely improbable
events are commonplace. It’s a consequence of more fundamental laws, which all
tie together to lead inevitably and inexorably to the occurrence of such
extraordinarily unlikely events.” Although we approve of Hand’s position that
events of vanishingly small probability will ultimately happen, we strongly
disagree with establishing statistical tests on point-null hypotheses and expecting
for coincidences and miracles to happen.
In light of the previous discussion, we restate the Zero probability paradox
in the following, more comprehensible way: in practice, when testing a mean of
the normal distribution using a point-null hypothesis, the probability of that
hypothesis is zero. This does not imply that it is “absolutely” impossible to state a
true point-null hypothesis, but that formulated point-nulls in the context of the
simple normal model are almost surely false.
Some Implications of the Zero Probability Paradox.
Fisher’s illuminating words (1922) are more relevant today than in 1922:
It cannot be denied that, during the recent rapid development of
practical methods, fundamental problems have been ignored and
fundamental paradoxes left unresolved…This anomalous state of
statistical science…the obscurity which envelops the theoretical bases
of statistical methods may perhaps be ascribed to two considerations.
In the first place, it appears to be widely thought, or rather felt, that in
a subject in which all results are liable to greater or smaller errors,
precise definition of ideas or concepts is, if not impossible, at least not
a practical necessity. In the second place, it has happened that in
statistics a purely verbal confusion has hindered the distinct
formulation of statistical problems. (p. 311-312)
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We argue that the Zero probability paradox has a specific power to shed new
light on some fundamental problems in the foundations of statistical science that
have been ignored, and help us to resolve some accumulated anomalies related to
the point-null hypothesis testing, including so-called large n problem in
significance testing, and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. It can also elucidate the
notion of the Bayes factor, mixed prior distribution advocated by Jeffreys,
“irreconcilability of p-values and evidence” (Berger & Sellke, 1987), and
Cromwell’s rule (Lindley, 1991, p. 104), among others.
However, detailed consideration of the implications of the Zero probability
paradox for the Fisherian significance testing, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing,
and Bayesian testing are beyond the scope of this paper. We confine ourselves,
therefore, only to some general implications. Berkson (1938) was the first to
notice dependence of significance testing on the sample size. He objected that it is
possible to obtain a statistically significant chi-square test merely by increasing
sample size:
I believe that an observant statistician who has had any considerable
experience with applying the chi-square test repeatedly will agree with
my statement that, as a matter of observation, when the numbers in the
data are quite large, the P's tend to come out small… we have
something here that is apt to trouble the conscience of a reflective
statistician using the chi-square test. For I suppose it would be agreed
by statisticians that a large sample is always better than a small sample.
If, then, we know in advance the P that will result from an application
of a chi-square test to a large sample there would seem to be no use in
doing it on a smaller one. But since the result of the former test is
known, it is no test at all!” [italicized for emphasis]
Berkson failed to recognize that the same deficiency (sensitivity to sample
size) is also shared by other significance tests based on point-null hypotheses and
continuous data. Today this is well known as the large n problem. As argued by
Mayo (2006, p. 809): “for any discrepancy from the null, however small, one can
find a sample size such as there is a high probability (as high as one likes) that the
test will yield a statistically significant result (for any p-value one wishes).” She
claims that the large n problem is the basis for the famous Jeffreys-Lindley
paradox (Lindley, 1957), probably the most quoted divergence between the
frequentist and Bayesian approaches to inference. A number of suggestions have
been proposed to alleviate this problem, including adjustment of p-values to a
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fixed sample size (Good, 1988, p. 391), rules of thumb for decreasing α as n
increases, and indicated effect size.
Karl Pearson (1935b, p. 550) opined “there is only one case in which an
hypothesis can be definitely rejected, namely when its probability is zero.”
Relating this to the Zero probability paradox leads to the following conclusion.
Focusing on the inferential aspects of the problem (not on the decision-making
approach) permits rejecting the point-null hypothesis a priori, before seeing data.
To paraphrase Berkson, because the result of the significance tests are known,
they are no test at all. Term testing is a misnomer in this case and should be
replaced by inexactification. These tests are merely procedures that ask
researchers to waste their time and financial resources, to collect enough data, and
when ultimately reject their point nulls to confirm what they knew beforehand,
that their point nulls were almost surely false.
Zero probability paradox points to the root cause of the large n problem and
discloses that there is no cure for it under the current point-null paradigm.
Because classical significance tests (Z and t-test) are consistent, as the sample size
increase, they will become extremely sensitive and therefore, detect even the
tiniest discrepancy from the crisp hypothetical (almost surely false) null
hypothesis. In other words, classical test statistic converges almost surely to ∞
and therefore, gives the asymptotically correct result (see, for example, DasGupta,
2008, p. 337, or Lehman and Romano, 2005, p. 462). Again, this means that in the
real world testing any sharp null hypothesis of the normal mean will be ultimately,
almost surely, rejected with large enough sample size.
This significant logical inconsistency of the significance testing was not an
overwhelming issue in the first half of the past century when Gosset was
“‘naughtily’ playing about with absurdly small numbers” (Eagon Pearson, 1939, p.
217). However, if Efron’s view (2010, p. VII) is embraced that in the 21st century,
statisticians will deal with large data sets and complex questions, it is clear that
the current point-null paradigm is inadequate. Van der Laan and Rose (2010), for
example, indicated that next generation of statisticians must construct new tools
for massive data sets since the current ones are severely limited. Similarly, Hand
(1998, p. 113) insisted in data mining instead of “statistical significance, consider
more carefully substantive significance: is the effect important or valuable or not?”
To rephrase Box (1979): the only question of interest is "Is the normal
model based on point-null hypothesis illuminating and useful?" The answer must
be “No”.
So, what should we do? This article is an initial contribution to making a
paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses. Instead of testing highly
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problematic and almost surely false point null hypotheses, as a natural
replacement, test a negligible null hypothesis:

H 0 :   0   (Effect size is negligible) against
H1 :   0   (Effect size is practically meaningful).
We propose naming this avant-garde proposal the “Hodges-Lehmann
paradigm”. Hodges and Lehmann (1954) were among first statisticians who had
noted deficiencies of the point null hypothesis and formulated testing of “material
significance” in their path-breaking paper “Testing the approximate validity of
statistical hypotheses”. We do not regard the Hodges-Lehmann paradigm as deus
ex machine, nor as a magic alternative to the traditional point-null testing.
However, we argue that it will substantially improve scientific research based on
statistical testing. The argument that point nulls are mathematically more tractable
is obsolete and belongs to the pre-MCMC era.
We regard statistics as the grammar of science. Thus, we are responsible for
providing unambiguous rules of that grammar. We should not feel proud if nonstatisticians are trying to make reform in statistical inference and statistics
education. We, statisticians, are accountable to provide researchers in other
sciences non-conflicting, coherent, and consistent concepts of testing the
statistical hypotheses. Otherwise, significance tests “can actually impede
scientific progress.” (Kirk, 2003, p. 100) and even harm “development of
scientific knowledge” (Armstrong, 2007, p. 321). Researchers and scientists will
feel confused and deceived by statistics and statisticians. As pointed out by
Cousins (2014, p. 35): “More than a half century after Lindley drew attention to
the different dependence of p-values and Bayes factors on sample size n
(described two decades previously by Jeffreys), there is still no consensus on how
best to communicate results of testing scientific hypotheses.”
Presumably, we all agree on the point that overcoming of accumulated
inconsistencies is always a crucial method in science. As pointed out by Good
(1982, p. 489), “a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise or synthesis is necessary for
human reasoning.” We argue that this compromise is impossible to reach within
the point null-hypothesis testing paradigm, as Jeffreys-Lindley paradox evidently
testifies.
In sharp contrast to the current point-nulls model, we argue that it is possible
to harmonize inferential results of frequentist and Bayesian testing within the new
framework. In other words, frequentist and Bayesian inference will become, in

15

TESTING POINT NULL HYPOTHESIS OF A NORMAL MEAN

principle, compatible and would (or at least could) lead to the similar conclusions
in (a) one-sided testing, (b) two-sided testing, and (c) interval estimation.
However, to make this proposal fully justifiable it is necessary to obtain a
proof that point nulls are also almost always false in the case of two samples. The
initial clue is given by Tukey (1991, p. 100):
“Statisticians classically asked the wrong questions—and were willing
to answer with a lie, one that was often downright lie. They asked
“Are the effects of A and B different?” and they were willing to
answer “no.” All we know about the world teaches us that the effects
of A and B are always different—in some decimal place—for any A
and B. Thus asking ‘Are the effects different’ is foolish.”
Only then, we can set as one of the fundamental rules of the 21 st century
Statistical Science Decalogue: Hypotheses exactas non fingo!
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